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Positive and Negative Feedback
in Experimental Housing Markets∗
Te Bao† and Cars Hommes‡
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Abstract. Asset markets are characterized by positive feedback through speculative
demand. But housing markets distinguish themselves from other asset markets in
that the supply of housing is endogenous, and adds negative feedback to the mar-
ket. We design an experimental housing market and study how the strength of the
negative feedback, i.e., the supply elasticity, affects market stability. In the absence
of endogenous housing supply, the experimental markets exhibit large bubbles and
crashes because speculators coordinate on trend-following expectations. When the
positive feedback through speculative demand is offset by the negative feedback of
elastic housing supply the market stabilizes and prices converge to fundamental value.
Individual expectations and aggregate market outcome is well described by a behav-
ioral forecasting heuristics model. Our results suggest that negative feedback policies
may stabilize speculative asset bubbles.
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Are housing price bubbles and crashes cycle less likely to emerge when the market
supply is more elastic? This question deserves careful investigation because the boom
and bust in the US housing market in early 2000s is considered a main contributor to
the recent financial crisis. Many previous studies focused on speculative asset pricing
models on the demand side of the market, but real estate assets also distinguishes
themselves from other assets in that the supply of housing is endogenous and responds
to price changes. As Glaser et al (2008) observed “models of housing price volatility
that ignore supply miss a fundamental part of the housing market”.
The answer to the question seems straightforward at first glance. An intuitive
argument would be that if housing supply is very elastic, it increases immediately
in response to positive demand shocks, and hence makes bubbles less likely, or last
shorter. Wheaton (1999) shows in a theoretical model that housing cycles are less
likely when the elasticity of supply is larger than the elasticity of demand. Glaser
et al. (2008) search for empirical evidence to address this question. They categorize
US cities to areas with high versus low supply elasticities according to Saiz (2008),
but find that price boom and bust also happened in high elasticity cities, although
in these cases, the duration of cycles is indeed shorter than in low elasticity cities.
Figure 1 plots the Case-Shiller index in some major cities in the US. Among these
cities, New York, Seattle and Chicago are considered as low elasticity cities, and
Denver, Atlanta and Las-Vegas are considered as high elasticity cities. Both types
of cities may experience large boom-bust cycles (e.g., New York and Las Vegas).
Seattle and Chicago have mild fluctuations. Atlanta does not experience very rapid
appreciation of house prices in the boom periods, but shows a severe price decline in
the bust. Denver is the only one among these cities that does not experience large
fluctuation during the first decade of the 21st century.
Thus, an empirical answer to the question may not be as straightforward as it
appears at first sight. One reason may be that when the supply elasticity is higher,
the market is also more likely to “overbuild” once the housing price increases. The
larger “overbuilding” drives the housing price down more severely in a bust, and
contributes to the fluctuation of the housing price.
















Case Shiller Index US Cities
Figure 1: Case-Shiller index in 6 US major cities. New York, Seattle and Chicago are
considered as low elasticity cities, and Denver, Atlanta and Las-Vegas are considered
as high elasticity cities according to Saiz (2008). The time series are monthly data
from January 2000 to June 2012.
supply affect the likelihood of boom-bust cycles in housing markets. Ideally, one
would like to address this question with field data. But as is seen from the discussion
of the literature, there are many factors that influence housing prices, which makes it
difficult to disentangle the effect of the supply elasticity alone. For example, Glaser
et al. (2008) argue that due to this difficulty, it is hard to conclude how the supply
elasticity influences the stability of the housing market. One advantage of laboratory
experiment is that it takes full control over other variables, and therefore single out
the effect of a change in one variable or parameter (housing supply elasticity in this
paper). The main result of this paper is that ceteris paribus, there are indeed fewer
boom-bust cycles in experimental housing markets with higher supply elasticity. The
contributions of our paper include:
First, we design an experiment where we take full control over the fundamental
price of housing so that the only difference between markets in different treatments
is the supply elasticity. This effectively rules out the confounding variables with
field data, and helps to draw clean causal inference. We compare three treatments
where the housing supply is (1) completely inelastic, (2) of low elasticity and (3) of
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high elasticity. We find strong evidence that, ceteris paribus, the market price is less
volatile and deviates less from the REE in markets with high supply elasticity.
Secondly, this may be the first laboratory experiments on housing market. Stephens
and Tyran (2012) studied nominal loss aversion on housing market using survey exper-
iment, and find that people may have difficulty in finding that a housing transaction
is disadvantageous when it generates a real loss but nominal gain. Hirota et al. (2015)
study how endowment effect influences price setting by home sellers in the market.
But to our knowledge, there is not yet a laboratory experiment on housing markets
that studies the individual decisions and its influence on the market (in)stability.
Thirdly, in terms of the relation between individual expectation and aggregate
market outcomes, the housing market is a positive expectation feedback system to
the investors, but a negative feedback system to the housing developers/constructors.
When investors predict that the price will go up, the demand increases, which has a
tendency to drive the price up. In contrast, when the constructors predict that the
price will increase, they will tend to build more, which makes the supply increase, and
has a tendency to drive the price down. There have been several experimental studies
of purely negative feedback markets (Hommes et al, 2007), as well as purely positive
feedback markets (Hommes et al, 2005, 2008; Bao et al., 2015). There have also been
experimental studies comparing the two different types of markets (Heemeijer et al,
2009, Sonnemans and Tuinstra, 2010, Bao et al, 2012)1. The current paper designs
the first experimental market combining both features. The main result of former
studies is that markets with negative feedbacks have a natural tendency to stabilize,
i.e. the price converges to the rational expectation equilibrium (REE) within a few
periods, while it is generally very difficult for the markets with positive feedback to
converge to the REE, and it is very likely to observe price bubbles and crashes in
positive feedback markets. A natural question to ask is then: is it possible stabilize
a market with positive feedbacks by adding negative feedback to it? In the specific
environment like experimental housing market, this would be to increase the supply
elasticity. Our finding suggests the answer is “yes”. This result has important policy
implications: speculative bubbles and crashes may be mitigated by negative feedback
1Fehr and Tyran (2008) also find the market price converges faster to the REE under strategic
substitutes (similar to negative feedback) than strategic complements (positive feedback). Positive
expectation feedback is also similar to the concept of “reflexivity” proposed by George Soros (2003).
Hommes (2013) provides a detailed discussion about the relation between the concepts.
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policies that weaken the overall positive feedback in markets.
This paper employs a “learning to forecast” experimental design (for the discus-
sion on the difference between “learning to forecast” versus “learning to optimize”
design, see Duffy, 2008 and Assenza et al. 2014), where participants submit a price
expectation and their optimal quantity decision is determined by computer trading.
Expectations are known to play an important role in asset markets, and the housing
market is certainly no exception. There is a literature in real estate economics that
finds that rational expectation hypothesis may not provide good prediction for the
price dynamics on the housing market. Mankiw and Weil (1989) notice that it is
difficult to explain the sharp increase of housing prices in the 1970s with traditional
models assuming rational expectation and efficient markets. Clayton (1997) finds that
housing price may move in a direction opposite to the rational expectation fundamen-
tal. One possible explanation is that the sharp increase of housing prices in the short
run may be driven by “irrational” expectations. Another contribution of our paper
is that we use a behavioral heuristics switching model (Brock and Hommes, 1997;
Anufriev and Hommes, 2012) to explain individual as well as aggregate behavior.
The results of former learning to forecast experiments suggest that agents tend to use
different expectation rules in the positive and negative feedback markets. In positive
feedback markets, they are more likely to coordinate on a common expectation and
become users of trend extrapolation rules, while in negative feedback markets, there
is low level of coordination of expectations across agents, and they are more likely to
become users of adaptive or contrarian expectations (Anufriev and Hommes, 2012b;
Bao et al., 2012). For a market that is a negative feedback system to some partici-
pants (constructors) and a positive feedback system to others (speculators), a natural
research question will be whether there will be coordination of expectations between
all agents. When positive feedback from speculative demand dominates negative
feedback from housing supply, housing bubbles arise through agents’ coordination
on a trend-following strategy. If on the other hand positive feedback is weakened
enough by housing supply the market is rather stable and individuals coordinate on
stabilizing adaptive expectations.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the experimen-
tal design, while Section 3 reports the experimental results. Section 4 calibrates a
heuristics switching model explaining individual as well as aggregate behavior. Fi-




We consider an economy where zsi,t is the housing supply by the constructor i in period
t, and zdh,t is the housing demand from the speculative investor h at period t. The
individual supply and demand depends on pei,t+1, p
e
h,t+1, which are the prediction on





peh,t+1 + Etyt+1 −Rpt
aσ2
These supply and demand functions can be derived from maximization problem
of the constructors and investors as in Appendix A, where R is the gross interest
rate for a risk free investment (i.e. a bond), and c is a parameter taking care of
the marginal cost in a quadratic cost function for the constructors. Let H, I be the
number of investors and constructors in the market. For simplicity, we let aσ2 = H.






















h,t+1 + Etyt+1 −Rpt)
aσ2
= peh,t+1 + Etyt+1 −Rpt
where pei,t+1, p
e
h,t+1 are the average expected housing price by constructors and in-
vestors. The supply and demand function by individual speculator and constructor
can be derived from maximization problem of mean-variance utility by the specula-
tors, or the expected profit for the constructors. This model setting can be developed
from the pure asset pricing model used in Hommes et al (2005) (based on the asset
pricing model in Cuthbertson and Nitzsche (2005) or Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay
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(1997)), which is later used in the empirical work by Bolt et al (2015). The theoretical
work by Dieci and Westerhoff (2012) also adopt a similar model setup. For simplicity,
yt+1 is the dividend paid by the asset, typically in terms of housing rent in this case.
We assume Etyt+1 is constant over time, and Etyt+1 = y.





(peh,t+1 + y − cpei,t+1) + νt (1)
where we add a small noise term νt ∼ N(0, 1), which represents other random
shocks that may influence the housing price. As can be seen from the equation, the
housing price will increase when the average price prediction by the investors goes up,
and decrease when the average price prediction by the constructors goes up. Therefore
this market is a positive expectation feedback system for the investors, and negative
expectation feedback system for the constructors.
By substituting in peh,t+1 = p
e
i,t+1 = pt, a rational expectation equilibrium, as well
as steady state of the system is:
p∗ =
y
R− 1 + c (2)
The rational expectation equilibrium of housing price is an increasing function of
the dividend (rent) payment y, and a decreasing function in the gross interest rate
R, and the elasticity of housing supply c.
2.2 Parameterizations
We use R = 1.05, which is an interest rate commonly used in the literature. This
means holding the supply by the constructors equal, one unit increase in the expected
price in period t + 1 by the investors will lead to 1/1.05 ≈ 0.95 unit increase in the
market price in period t. For a given parameter c, one unit increase in the expected
price for period t+1 by the constructors will lead to c/R decrease in the housing price
in period t. In other words, if the constructors and speculators have homogeneous




(pet+1 + y) + νt, (3)
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where pe is the average price expectation of all the speculators and constructors.
We can call the new slope of the equation 1−c
R
the “overall strength of expectation
feedback”. In this experiment, we take three values of c, which are c = 0, 0.1 and 0.25.
Therefore, the slope 1−c
R
is always positive. 1−c
R
measures when the average expected
price in the whole market goes up by 1 unit, how much the realized price change.
c = 0 is the benchmark case where there is no constructors, and the market is purely
positive feedback system. When c = 0.1, 1−c
R
= 0.86, the price goes up by about 0.86
when the average expected price goes up by 1 unit, and c = 0.25, 1−c
R
= 0.71, the
price goes up by about 0.71 when the average expected price goes up by 1 unit. The
research question is when we increase the slope of the supply function c, and therefore
makes the slope of the overall expectation feedback system smaller, whether it makes
the market price more stable2.
The REE is the same (p∗ = 60) in all three treatments. According to equation
(2), this means different levels of y need to be chosen for each treatment. Therefore
we have y = 3 when c = 0, y = 9 when c = 0.1, and y = 18 when c = 0.25.
2.3 Treatments
Based on the supply elasticity of the market, three treatments are set up:
Treatment with no supply (treatment N): there is no constructor on the mar-
ket. Therefore c can be considered as 0. We let 6 investors participate in each
market, and the market price only depends on the average price expectation by
the investors.
2 Sonnemans and Tuinstra (2010) study the price behavior in positive feedback markets with two
different “strengths of feedback” (i.e., slope of the price feedback map) 0.67 and 0.95. They find
that the market price deviates persistently from the REE benchmark in the strong positive feedback
markets where the slope is 0.95, while the price mostly converges in the markets with weak positive
feedback with slope 0.67. Our experiment sheds some light on the price behavior when the slope
is between 0.67 and 0.95. We find that the market price converges to the REE when the overall
slope is 0.71 (i.e., when the supply coefficient c = 0.25). Given that there is no systematic difference
between the price expectations by the constructors and speculators, this suggests that the necessary
condition for the price in a positive feedback markets to converge is that the slope of the price
feedback map is less than or equal to 0.7.
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Treatment with low supply elasticity (treatment L): There 5 investors and 5
constructors in each market. The slope of the supply function is c = 0.1. The
market price depends on both expectations by the investors and constructors,
but the influence from the constructors is very small.
Treatment with high supply elasticity (treatment H): There 5 investors and 5
constructors in each market. The slope of the supply function is c = 0.25. The
market price depends on both expectations by the investors and constructors,
and the influence from the constructors is larger than in treatment L.
2.4 Payoff Scheme
The subjects are paid in terms of points, which are converted into Euros after the
experiment. The payoff function is show in equation (4). It is a decreasing function





(pt − peh,t)2, 0} (4)
This is a quadratic loss function, and the subjects earn 0 points if his prediction
error is larger than 7. At the end of the experiment, subjects are paid 1 Euro for each
3000 points they earned in the experiment, plus a 7 Euro show up fee.
3 Experimental Result
The experiment was run on June 6, August 26, August 29 and October 23, 2013 at
the CREED lab, University of Amsterdam. 134 subjects were recruited. 4 markets
were established for treatment N, 5 for treatment L and 6 for treatment H. The
fluctuation in the number of observations is due to show up rate of subjects. We use
slightly fewer observation for treatment N because the design in this treatment is the
same as the asset market experiment by Hommes et al. (2008), except that we use
the framing of housing market instead of stock market. Therefore, it is conducted
to make sure that the bubbles/crashes patter in the data of Hommes et al. (2008)
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is not affected by the change of framing. Given we confirmed that this is true, 4
observations can be considered a representative sample to make comparison with
the markets in other treatments. The duration of a typical session is 1 hour and 5
minutes, including instructions reading and payment. The experiment uses purely
between subjects design. No subject participates in more than one session.
3.1 Market Price Dynamics
Figure 2 to 4 report the market price in different treatments. Generally, the prices
are more stable in treatment with higher supply slopes/elasticities. If we claim that
the market price converges to the REE when the difference between the price and
the REE is smaller than 3, and forever afterwards, none of the markets in treatment
N and L converges, while all markets in treatment H converge. It takes between 27
periods and 42 periods before the prices in treatment H converge to the REE. There
is one market in treatment N that experiences a huge bubble, peaking at about 800,
which is about 13 times the fundamental price (REE).




















Figure 2: The market prices against the REE price in treatment N.
To quantify the deviation of the market price from the REE, we calculate the
Relative Absolute Deviation (RAD) and Relative Deviation (RD) in each market
following the definition by Sto¨kl et al. (2010). These two definitions are used to
show the average deviation of the market price over the periods as a fraction of the
9

























Figure 3: The market prices against the REE price in treatment L.
















where i is the notation for each market, and pi,t is the price in market i at period
t. The results are presented in Table 1. Clearly, the average RAD is largest in
treatment N, followed by treatment L, and smallest in treatment H. The average RD
is the largest in treatment N, however, very similar in treatment L and H. A Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test suggests that the difference between the RAD in treatment H and
each of treatment L and N is significant at 5% level, while the difference between other
pairs of treatments is not significant. The difference between the RD in treatment H
10






























Figure 4: The market prices against the REE price in treatment H.
and N is significant at 5% level, but not between other pairs of treatments.
Table 2 shows the variance of market prices in each market. The variance is very
larger for markets in treatment N, and much smaller for markets in treatment L and
H.
3.2 Individual Prediction
Figure 5 shows the individual predictions in a typical market (market 1) in each of
treatment N, L and H (namely, N1, L1 and H1). Previous studies (Heemeijer et al.
2009, Bao et al. 2012) show that agents have high level of coordination of expectations
(expectations are highly homogeneous) in the positive feedback markets, and low
level of coordination in the negative feedback markets. The housing markets in our
experiment is a negative feedback system to the constructors, and a positive feedback
system to the speculators. Therefore, there are three possibilities ex ante: (1) all
agents coordinate their expectations at a high level, (2) there is little coordination
11
Treatment Treatment N Treatment L Treatment H
Market RAD RD RAD RD RAD RD
Market 1 241.78% 221.64% 16.23% 8.15% 6.79% -3.01%
Market 2 33.71% -5.01% 22.74% -11.55% 5.33% -0.10%
Market 3 56.29% 32.74% 25.97% 2.66% 8.43% -2.27%
Market 4 16.91% -6.27% 24.76% -8.18% 5.03% -1.04%
Market 5 16.20% 2.89% 4.47% -0.92%
Market 6 1.33% -0.60%
Mean 87.17% 60.77% 21.18% -1.21% 5.23% -1.32%
Median 45.00% 13.86% 22.74% 2.66% 5.18% -0.98%
Table 1: The RAD and RD in each market.
Treatment Market Variance


















Table 2: The variance of market price in each market.
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between the expectations of the agents and (3) the speculators have a high level of
coordination of expectations between each other, while the constructors have low level
of coordinations between themselves, and with the speculators. The results generally
confirm with the first conjecture. There is high level of coordination between the
price expectations of both speculators and constructors. After a few initial periods,
all the prediction time series tend to follow the same direction, which is generally
the direction of the price movement. Meanwhile, there is heterogeneity in individual
expectations, in the sense that the expectations of some subjects are persistently
further away from the market price.















Figure 5: The individual predictions (dashed lines) plotted against the market price
(thick line) in a typical market in each of treatment N (market N1, upper panel), L
(market L1, middle panel) and H (market H1, lower panel).
To better examine whether there is a systematic difference between the predictions
made by the speculators and constructors in the same market, Figure 6 and 7 shows
the average price forecast by the investors (circles) and constructors (triangles) plotted
against the market price (thick line). The graphs suggest that there is no systematic
difference between the average predictions by the two types of agents in the same
market. We conducted a t-test on the two samples (expectations by investors and
constructors), and the means are also not significant at 5% level in any of the markets
13
in treatment L and H.

























Figure 6: The average predictions by the speculators (Xs) and constructors (dia-
monds) in each market in treatment L.
3.3 Estimation of Individual Forecasting Strategies
We consider two types of simple heuristics. The first type is a trend rule, where the
participants extrapolate a price change from the last observed price.
peh,t+1 = pt−1 + γh(pt−1 − pt−2). (7)
A positive coefficient γ means a trend following rule; while a negative coefficient γ
means a contrarian rule. Table 6 to 8 show the estimation results of equation 7 with
a coefficient that is significant at 5% level. It turns out the coefficient is significant
for 15 out of 24 subjects in treatment N, 26 out of 50 subjects in treatment L and
60 out of 60 subjects in treatment H. The range of γ is [0.49, 2.63] in treatment N,
14






























Figure 7: The average predictions by the speculators (Xs) and constructors (dia-
monds) in each market in treatment H.
[−1.51, 1.16] in treatment L and [−1.65, 1.68] in treatment H. The median of γ is 1.28
in treatment N, 0.52 in treatment L and 1.38 in treatment H.
The second simple rule is the adaptive expectations rule:
peh,t+1 = p
e
t−1 + wh(pt−1 − pet−1), (8)
where the prediction is a weighted average of the previous prediction and the
last observed price. Tables 9 to 11 show the estimation result of equation 8 with a
coefficient that is significant at 5% level. It turns out the coefficient is significant for
20 out of 24 subjects in treatment N, 50 out of 50 subjects in treatment L and 60
out of 60 subjects in treatment H. The range of w is [−1.95, 2.39] in treatment N,
[0.30, 1.98] in treatment L and [0.68, 2.01] in treatment H. The median of w is 0.87 in
treatment N, 0.55 in treatment L and 1.54 in treatment H.
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4 Estimation of Heuristic Switching Model
The heuristic switching model (HSM) is a heterogeneous expectations model based
on evolutionary selection of forecasting heuristics proposed by Anufriev and Hommes
(2012). It is an extension of Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998). HSM is able to ex-
plain the different price dynamics: monotonic convergence, persistent oscillations and
dampened oscillations in different experimental markets in the asset pricing experi-
ment of Hommes et al (2005) and Hommes et al (2008). In our experiment, we also
see all these types of price dynamics. In general, most markets exhibit monotonic
convergence in treatment H, persistent oscillations in treatment N and dampened os-
cillations in treatment L. It assumes that the subjects chose between a finite menu of
four simple heuristics depending upon their relative performance (measured by mean
squared error). Hommes et al (2005, 2008) are two 2-period ahead LtFE asset pricing
experiments. The four rules in the model are therefore as follows:
An adaptive expectation (ADA) rule:
pet+1,1 = p
e
t + 0.75(pt − pet,1). (9)
The weak trend rules (WTR) given by:
pet+1,2 = pt + 0.4(pt − pt−1). (10)
The strong trend extrapolating rule (TRE) given by:
pet+1,2 = pt + 1.3(pt − pt−1). (11)




t + pt) + (pt − pt−1). (12)
We use w = 0.75 for the adaptive rule because it is about the median of the
estimated coefficient using equation (8). We use 0.4 and 1.3 as the coefficient for
weak and strong trend rule because they are about the minimum and maximum of
the estimated coefficient for equation (7), and also the same as those parameters used
in Anufriev and Hommes (2012). The learning, anchoring and adjustment (LAA)
rule uses a time varying anchor, 0.5(pavt + pt), which is the average of the price in the
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last period and the sample mean of all past prices, and extrapolates the last price
trend pt− pt−1. Because it includes a flexible time-varying anchor, the LAA rule was
successful in explaining persistent oscillations in Hommes et al (2005, 2008).
Subjects switch between these forecasting heuristics based on their relative perfor-
mance in terms of mean squared error. The performance of heuristic h, h ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}
is written as:
Ut,h = −(pt − pet,h)2 + ηUt−1,h, (13)
where nh,t is the fraction of the agents using heuristic h in the whole population.
The parameter η ∈ [0, 1] shows the relative weight the agents give to errors in all
past periods compared to the most recent one. When η = 0, only the most recent
performance is taken into account, and when η > 0, all past errors matter for the
performance. The specific weight updating rule is given by a discrete choice model
with asynchronous updating rule from Hommes, Huang and Wang (2005) and Diks
and van der Weide (2005):
nt,h = δnt−1,h + (1− δ) exp(βUt−1,h)∑4
i=1 exp(βUt−1,i)
. (14)
The parameter δ ∈ [0, 1] represents the inertia with which participants stick to
their past forecasting heuristic. When δ = 1, the agents do not update at all. When
δ > 0, each period a fraction of 1 − δ participants updates their weights. The pa-
rameter β ≥ 0 represents the “sensitivity” to switch to another strategy. The higher
the β, the faster the participants switch to more successful rules in the most recent
past. When β = 0, the agents allocate equal weight on each of the heuristics. When
β = +∞, all agents who switch to the most successful heuristic in the last period
immediately.
Figure 4 shows the simulated market price by the HSM model with the benchmark
parameterization β = 0.4, η = 0.7, δ = 0.9, against the experimental market price in
a typical market (market 1) in each treatment. The benchmark parameters were used
in Anufriev and Hommes (2012a,b) to describe different experimental asset markets
in Hommes et al (2005, 2008). Since we have similar patterns of price dynamics, we
can check whether the model can be applied to a completely different experiment
17









































































































Figure 8: The simulated and experimental market price (left panel) and the simulated
fractions of users of different heuristics (right panel) in a typical market in treatment
N (upper panel), L (middle panel) and H (lower panel).
with the original setting. The result turns out to be very good. The simulated
prices fit the experimental data very well. When we check the weights of different
forecasting heuristics: the typical market in treatment N is mostly dominated by
the strong trend rule, which leads to sharp price fluctuations; the typical market in
treatment L is firstly dominated by strong trend rule, but then the anchoring and
adjustment rule in later periods, which leads to dampened oscillations; the typical
market in treatment H is firstly dominated by the anchoring and adjustment rule and
then the adaptive rule near the end of the experiment, which leads to convergence
via dampened oscillation at the beginning periods of the price dynamics.
Table 4 reports the mean squared error of several forecasting heuristics and the
HSM. We highlight the model that provides the best fit in terms of mean squared
18
error for each market. Out of 15 markets in this experiment, the HSM Benchmark
provides the best fit for 14 markets.
Besides HSM Benchmark, we also conducted a grid search of optimal values of
β, η, δ that minizes the mean squared error of the model. We do it on the domain
[0, 10], [0, 1], [0, 1] with step length of 0.1. It turns out for most markets, β is typicall
about 0.1, η is zero, and δ is either around 0.5 or 0.9. The result suggests that the
agents switch between the heuristics at a very low intensity in this experiment, and
the inertia of choice is very high. The HSM optimal model provides smaller MSE
than all other models, including HSM Benchmark in all markets.
Based on the results of the HSM optimal model, we calculated the average weight
of each heurisitic over the markets in each treatment at each time period, and over all
the periods. Table 4 reports the average weight of each heurisitic over all the markets
and periods in each treatment. When the supply elasticity increases from treatment
N to L and hence H, the average weight of the strong trend (STR) heurisitic declines
substantially, and the weight of the adaptive (ADA) rule increases. The weight of LAA
heurisitic is very high in treatment L, which imposes dampened oscillation. Figure
4 shows the evolvement of the average weight of each heurisitic over the periods in
each treatment. In general, the figure confirms that there are more users of the strong
trend rule in treatment N, more for LAA heuristic in treatment L and for the adaptive
heurisitic in treatment H.
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Treatment N
Specification Market 1 Market 2 Market 3 Market 4
Fundamental 46297.37 596.94 2192.08 169.55
Naive 2899.56 385.22 82.24 108.40
ADA heuristic 13576.30 851.81 506.54 271.25
WTR heuristic 6862.86 1117.51 214.25 321.66
STR heuristic 2881.01 1486.85 78.65 472.72
LAA heuristic 8145.86 1020.85 427.07 251.19
HSM Benchmark 1897.91 204.77 93.21 49.15
HSM Optimal 1014.93 97.41 32.36 37.96
β 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3
η 0.1 0 0 0
δ 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.4
Treatment L
Specification Market 1 Market 2 Market 3 Market 4 Market 5
Fundamental 131.70 320.03 379.56 313.65 168.85
Naive 32.14 131.53 128.32 132.73 69.87
ADA heuristic 127.65 379.22 417.70 381.17 226.63
WTR heuristic 90.41 392.73 375.29 396.44 203.89
STR heuristic 80.04 507.04 457.50 518.97 240.71
LAA heuristic 48.29 267.91 261.55 259.78 129.23
HSM Benchmark 27.64 102.19 94.19 104.01 53.19
HSM Optimal 18.73 60.23 64.93 41.37 32.99
β 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
η 0 0.1 0 0 0
δ 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5
Treatment H
Specification Market 1 Market 2 Market 3 Market 4 Market 5 Market 6
Fundamental 24.33 16.27 51.97 10.91 11.59 1.80
Naive 8.66 7.45 21.68 4.75 4.71 0.45
ADA heuristic 33.20 28.17 80.08 19.87 12.71 1.50
WTR heuristic 24.49 21.17 62.51 12.66 9.34 1.04
STR heuristic 23.25 20.74 62.64 10.67 12.69 1.29
LAA heuristic 13.94 13.10 40.29 9.48 11.21 1.65
HSM Benchmark 5.29 4.90 14.02 2.90 1.67 0.13
HSM Optimal 3.92 2.92 10.66 1.63 1.56 0.11
β 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 10
η 0 0 0 0 0 0.5
δ 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
Table 3: The fitness of different models to the experimental data. HSM benchmark
means the heuristic switching model where β = 0.4, η = 0.7, δ = 0.9.
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Heuristic Treatment N Treatment L Treatment H
ADA 19.85% 21.20% 27.07%
WTR 16.55% 12.31% 19.81%
STR 40.12% 30.57% 25.42%
LAA 23.48% 35.92% 27.69%
Table 4: The average weight of each heuristic over the markets in each treatment
according to the HSM optimal model.
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Figure 9: The average simulated fractions of users of different heuristics in treatment
N (upper panel), L (middle panel) and H (lower panel).
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5 Conclusion
We study the relationship between supply elasticity and price dynamics in experi-
mental housing markets using a “learning to forecast” design. The main result is
that when the supply elasticity increases, the market price becomes more stable.
The housing market exhibits both positive feedback through speculative demand
and negative feedback from endogenous housing supply. While the market is a positive
feedback system to the investors and a negative feedback system to the constructors,
there is generally no systematic difference in price predictions made by the two types
of agents. We find that when positive feedback dominates negative feedback, i.e., the
demand elasticity is larger than the supply elasticity, housing bubbles arise because
most agents, regardless of their types, will tend to use a trend extrapolation strategy
when making price forecasts.
In order to capture the heterogeneity in individual expectations and their impact
on aggregate market outcome, we calibrate a heuristic switching model to the experi-
ment. The model provides a very good fit to individual decisions as well as aggregate
market data in all treatments. Depending on the relative strength of positive versus
negative feedback, i.e. demand versus supply elasticity, the evolutionary selection
among the forecasting heuristics selects a different dominating strategy. For a low
supply elasticity (strong positive feedback) trend-following rules dominate leading
to housing bubbles and crashes; for intermediate supply elasticity (medium positive
feedback) an anchoring and adjustment rule dominates leading to (non-exploding)
price oscillations; for high elasticity (weak positive feedback) housing prices converge
to REE fundamental through coordination on adaptive expectations. This confirms
the obervation by Glaeser and Nathanson (2014) on housing bubbles:
“Many non-rational explanations for real estate bubbles exist, but the most promis-
ing theories emphasize some form of trend-chasing, which in turn reflects boundedly
rational learning.”
Our results have important policy implications: negative feedback policies that
reduce the overall positive feedback in speculative markets can mitigate bubbles and
market crashes.
Finally, for simplicity we studied only a spot market for housing in this experiment.
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In order to address the role of supply elasticity in real housing markets, it would be
interesting to take into account the stock-flow feature of the market (Wheaton, 1999),
namely that the houses built in the previous period may enter the market again in
later periods. We leave this question to future extension of this work.
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A Derivation of Individual Supply and Demand
Functions of the Market Participants
This section shows the derivation of the individual supplies and demands as a function
of the price expectations in section 2.1.
For the individual supply function of the constructors, we assume there are I
constructors, and each of them has a cost function c(q) = Iq
2
2
. The expected profit of
firm i, pieh,t+1, is then given by:
piei,t+1 = p
e
i,t+1qi,t − c(qi,t), (15)
where pei,t+1 is the expected housing price by constructor i for period t + 1. It
takes one period to finish the constructor. Therefore the price expectation for period
t + 1 determined housing constructor in period t. To maximize this expected profit
function, one has to take the first order derivative with respect to qi,t, and let it equal









For the individual demand function of the speculators, we can assume that they
have a myopic mean-variance utility function as the following:
Uh,t(z
d




where Wh,t+1 is their wealth, given by
Wh,t+1 = RWh,t + z
d
h,t(pt+1 + yt+1 −Rpt), (17)
where R is the gross interest rate of a risk-free asset. zdh,t is the individual demand
of the asset by each speculator. yt+1 is the assets dividend paid at the beginning of
period t + 1 and a is the risk aversion factor. For simplicity, we assume that the
variance of the return to one unit of the asset is a constant, which equals to σ2 over
time, and the variance of the portfolio is just a quadratic function of the demand, i.e.
Vh,t(pt+1 + yt+1 −Rpt) = σ2zdh,t2.
Standing at the beginning of each period, the current wealth Wh,t is a given
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number. The speculator just need to take first order condition with respect to zdh,t,
which leads to asigma2zdh,t = Eh,t(pt+1 + yt+1 − Rpt). Moreover, we assume the
expected value of yt+1 is also a constant over time, which equals to y. This will lead
to aσ2zdh,t = Eh,t(pt+1 + yt+1 −Rpt) = peh,t+1 + y −Rpt, namely,
zdh,t =




This section shows the experimental instructions for constructors and speculators in
the experiment in Treatment L. There is no instructions for developers in treatment
N, because there is no developers in the market in this treatment. The instructions for
speculators in treatment N and constructors and speculators in H are the same as in
treatment L, except that the dividend (rent) is 3 in treatment N, and 18 in treatment
H, and the instructions for the speculators in treatment N does not contain a section
about the developers.
B.1 Experimental Instructions for Construction Advisors
General information.
You are a construction advisor to real estate developer that wants to optimally
supply new houses to the market. In order to make an optimal decision the developer
needs an accurate prediction of the housing prices. As their construction advisor, you
have to predict the housing price during 50 subsequent time periods. Your earnings
during the experiment depend upon your forecasting accuracy. The smaller your
forecasting errors in each period, the higher your total earnings.
Information about the price determination in the housing market.
The housing price is determined by market clearing, namely supply equals de-
mand. The supply of housing is determined by the main real estate developers in
the market. The demand for houses is determined by the sum of aggregate demand
of a number of large investment funds and demand from housing consumers. There
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are also some small random shocks to housing prices due to fluctuation in the cost of
construction materials etc.
Information about the construction strategies of real estate developers.
Each of the real estate developer is advised by a construction advisor played by
a participant in the experiment, and there is no difference between these developers
except that they may receive different price forecast from their own advisors. The
precise strategy of the real estate developers you are advising is unknown. The
target of the developer is to maximize expected profit. The profit is the price times
supply minus cost. The cost is a typical concave function of the supply quantity. So
the supply by your firm is increasing in your price forecast. The higher your price
forecast, the larger amount you developer will construct. If all construction advisors
predict high/low housing price, the total supply will be high/low.
Information about the strategies of the investment funds.
Each of the investment funds is advised by a financial advisor played by one par-
ticipant in the experiment. The precise investment strategy of the investment fund is
unknown. The decision of the investment fund is to allocate money between a riskless
option (saving at a bank), and a risky option (buying houses). The bank account of
the risk free investment pays a fixed interest rate of 5% per period. The holder of the
houses receives a rental payment in each time period. These dividend payments are
uncertain however and vary over time. Economic experts of the investment funds have
computed that the average dividend (rent) payments are 9 (the same unit as housing
price) per time period. The return of investing in the housing market per period is
uncertain and depends upon (unknown) rental payments and the price changes of the
houses. The financial advisor of an investment fund is not asked to forecast housing
price in each period. Based upon his/her price forecast, his/her investment fund will
make an optimal investment decision. The higher the price forecast the larger will be
the fraction of money invested by the investment fund in the housing market, so the
larger will be their demand for houses.
The financial advisors also know there are construction advisors for real estate
developers. The information the financial advisors have about you is the same as the
information you have about them.
In sum, the most important information about the price determination in the
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housing market includes:
1. The price is determined by supply and demand. Higher supply/demand will
generally lead to lower/higher price.
2. The demand by an investment fund goes up/down when the forecast by its
financial advisor goes up/down.
3. The supply by a real estate developer goes up/down when the forecast by its
construction advisor goes up/down.
Forecasting task of the construction advisor.
The only task of the financial advisors in this experiment is to forecast the housing
price in each time period as accurate as possible. The forecast has to be made two
periods ahead. In the first period you have to make price forecasts for the both
period 1 and period 2. The prices in period 1 and 2 are between 0 and 100 per unit
(this restriction is only for the first 2 periods, and the price in later periods is not
necessarily always below 100). After all participants have given their predictions for
the first two periods, the housing price in period 1 will be revealed and based upon
your forecasting error your earnings for period 1 will be given. After that you have to
give your prediction for period 3. After all participants have given their predictions
for period 3, the housing market price in period 2 will be revealed and, based upon
your forecasting error your earnings for period 2 will be given. This process continues
for 51 periods.
To forecast the housing price pt+1 in period t, the available information thus
consists of
• past prices up to period t− 1,
• your past predictions up to period t− 1,
• past earnings up to period t− 1.
Earnings.
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Earnings will depend upon forecasting accuracy only. The better you predict the
housing price in each period, the higher your aggregate earnings. Earnings will be
according to the following earnings table.
B.2 Instruction for Financial Advisors
General information.
You are a financial advisor to an investment fund that wants to optimally invest
a large amount of money. The investment fund has two investment options: a risk
free investment and a risky investment. The risk free investment is putting money on
a bank account paying a fixed interest rate. The alternative risky investment is an
investment in the housing market. In each time period the investment fund has to
decide which fraction of their money to put on the bank account and which fraction
of the money to spend on buying houses. In order to make an optimal investment
decision the investment fund needs an accurate prediction of the housing price. As
their financial advisor, you have to predict the housing price during 50 subsequent
time periods. The forecast has to be made two periods ahead. Your earnings during
the experiment depend upon your forecasting accuracy. The smaller your forecasting
errors in each period, the higher your total earnings.
Information about the price determination in the housing market.
The housing price is determined by market clearing, namely supply equals de-
mand. The supply of housing is determined by the main real estate developers in
the market. The demand for houses is determined by the sum of aggregate demand
of a number of large investment funds and demand from housing consumers. There
are also some small random shocks to housing prices due to fluctuation in the cost of
construction materials etc.
Information about the investment strategies of the investment funds.
Each of the investment funds is advised by a financial advisor played by a par-
ticipant in the experiment, and there is no difference between these funds except
that they may receive different price forecast from their own advisors. The precise
investment strategy of the investment fund that you are advising and the investment
strategies of the other investment funds are unknown. The bank account of the risk
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free investment pays a fixed interest rate of 5% per period. In each period, the holder
of the houses receives a rental payment. These rental payments are uncertain how-
ever and vary over time. Economic experts of the investment funds have computed
that the average rental payments are 9 (the same unit as housing price) per time
period. The return of investing in the housing market per period is uncertain and
depends upon (unknown) rental payments and price changes of the houses. As the
financial advisor of an investment fund you are not asked to forecast rental payment,
but you are only asked to forecast the housing price in each period. Based upon your
price forecast, your investment fund will make an optimal investment decision. The
higher your price forecast the larger will be the fraction of money invested by your
investment fund in the housing market, so the larger will be their demand for houses.
Information about the strategies of the real estate developers.
Each of the real estate developers is advised by a construction advisor (also fore-
casting housing price) played by one participant in the experiment. The precise
strategy of the real estate developers is unknown. The higher the price forecast by
the construction advisor, the larger the number of houses the developer he/she is ad-
vising will construct, so the larger will be their supply for houses. These construction
advisors also know there are financial advisors for investment funds. The information
the construction advisors have about you is the same as the information you have
about them.
In sum, the most important information about the price determination in the
housing market includes:
1. The price is determined by supply and demand. Higher supply/demand will
generally lead to lower/higher price.
2. The demand by an investment fund goes up/down when the forecast by its
financial advisor goes up/down.
3. The supply by a real estate developer goes up/down when the forecast by its
construction advisor goes up/down.
Forecasting task of the financial advisor.
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The only task of the financial advisors in this experiment is to forecast the housing
price in each time period as accurate as possible. The forecast has to be made two
periods ahead. In the first period you have to make price forecasts for the both
period 1 and period 2. The prices in period 1 and 2 are between 0 and 100 per unit
(this restriction is only for the first 2 periods, and the price in later periods is not
necessarily always below 100). After all participants have given their predictions for
the first two periods, the housing price in period 1 will be revealed and based upon
your forecasting error your earnings for period 1 will be given. After that you have to
give your prediction for period 3. After all participants have given their predictions
for period 3, the housing market price in period 2 will be revealed and, based upon
your forecasting error your earnings for period 2 will be given. This process continues
for 51 periods.
To forecast the housing price in period , the available information thus consists of
• past prices up to period t− 1,
• your past predictions up to period t− 1,
• past earnings up to period t− 1.
Earnings. Earnings will depend upon forecasting accuracy only. The better you
predict the housing price in each period, the higher your aggregate earnings. Earnings
will be according to the following earnings table.
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C Payoff Table
Table 5 is the payoff table used in this experiment.
Payoff Table for Forecasting Task
Your Payoff=max[1300− 1300
49
(Your Prediction Error)2, 0]
2600 points equal 1 euro
error points error points error points error points
0 1300 1.85 1209 3.7 937 5.55 483
0.05 1300 1.9 1204 3.75 927 5.6 468
0.1 1300 1.95 1199 3.8 917 5.65 453
0.15 1299 2 1194 3.85 907 5.7 438
0.2 1299 2.05 1189 3.9 896 5.75 423
0.25 1298 2.1 1183 3.95 886 5.8 408
0.3 1298 2.15 1177 4 876 5.85 392
0.35 1297 2.2 1172 4.05 865 5.9 376
0.4 1296 2.25 1166 4.1 854 5.95 361
0.45 1295 2.3 1160 4.15 843 6 345
0.5 1293 2.35 1153 4.2 832 6.05 329
0.55 1292 2.4 1147 4.25 821 6.1 313
0.6 1290 2.45 1141 4.3 809 6.15 297
0.65 1289 2.5 1134 4.35 798 6.2 280
0.7 1287 2.55 1127 4.4 786 6.25 264
0.75 1285 2.6 1121 4.45 775 6.3 247
0.8 1283 2.65 1114 4.5 763 6.35 230
0.85 1281 2.7 1107 4.55 751 6.4 213
0.9 1279 2.75 1099 4.6 739 6.45 196
0.95 1276 2.8 1092 4.65 726 6.5 179
1 1273 2.85 1085 4.7 714 6.55 162
1.05 1271 2.9 1077 4.75 701 6.6 144
1.1 1268 2.95 1069 4.8 689 6.65 127
1.15 1265 3 1061 4.85 676 6.7 109
1.2 1262 3.05 1053 4.9 663 6.75 91
1.25 1259 3.1 1045 4.95 650 6.8 73
1.3 1255 3.15 1037 5 637 6.85 55
1.35 1252 3.2 1028 5.05 623 6.9 37
1.4 1248 3.25 1020 5.1 610 6.95 19
1.45 1244 3.3 1011 5.15 596 error ≥ 0
1.5 1240 3.35 1002 5.2 583
1.55 1236 3.4 993 5.25 569
1.6 1232 3.45 984 5.3 555
1.65 1228 3.5 975 5.35 541
1.7 1223 3.55 966 5.4 526
1.75 1219 3.6 956 5.45 512
1.8 1214 3.65 947 5.5 497
Table 5: Payoff Table for Forecasters
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D Estimated Forecasting Rules
D.1 Trend Extrapolation Rules
sub no. coefficient p-value R-squared MSE
n11 2.4337 0.0000 0.9414 2034.27
n12 2.1157 0.0000 0.8066 6453.40
n13 1.7794 0.0000 0.9112 2364.41
n14 1.8408 0.0000 0.9344 1813.48
n15 2.4010 0.0000 0.4922 22966.66
n16 2.6337 0.0000 0.9010 3552.42
n31 1.1605 0.0000 0.9803 38.04
n33 1.7259 0.0000 0.9862 28.83
n34 0.9861 0.0000 0.9647 59.05
n35 1.3398 0.0000 0.9805 35.25
n36 1.5440 0.0000 0.9754 51.99
n41 0.7395 0.0000 0.6426 90.51
n42 0.4897 0.0003 0.5547 95.23
n43 0.8246 0.0000 0.8049 60.35
n44 0.5080 0.0018 0.4978 134.35
Table 6: Above is the result of estimating peh,t+1 = pt−1 + γ(pt−1 − pt−2) (trend rule)
for the treatment N. The second and third column shows the estimated coefficients
and associated p−value. The fourth and fifth columns show the R2 and MSE of the
regressions.
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sub no. coefficient p-value R-squared MSE
l11 0.6049 0.0067 0.0356 154.32
l12 0.5037 0.0347 -0.1278 176.54
l13 0.6001 0.0183 -0.1617 200.85
l16 0.7205 0.0114 -0.3128 251.84
l17 0.3462 0.0404 0.1947 88.56
l18 0.5514 0.0311 -0.2837 203.20
l110 0.6018 0.0350 -0.4744 252.79
l41 -1.3363 0.0032 -0.9016 588.95
l42 -1.3089 0.0036 -0.6096 580.49
l43 -1.3359 0.0022 -0.3587 544.47
l44 -1.3208 0.0045 -0.3413 619.55
l45 -1.4331 0.0014 -0.4316 575.22
l46 -1.5156 0.0007 -0.4679 567.84
l47 -1.4167 0.0020 -0.5371 601.21
l48 -1.3288 0.0036 -0.6544 598.22
l49 -1.4837 0.0015 -0.2907 626.42
l410 -1.2902 0.0027 -0.3440 530.24
l51 0.9958 0.0000 0.8782 40.10
l52 0.8816 0.0000 0.5864 106.77
l53 0.3761 0.0418 0.4392 111.79
l54 0.8051 0.0000 0.8480 44.16
l55 0.9309 0.0000 0.6778 88.33
l56 1.1615 0.0000 0.6191 111.43
l57 0.8573 0.0000 0.7004 79.51
l58 0.6806 0.0015 0.6202 150.66
l59 0.7655 0.0000 0.8042 43.67
l510 0.8300 0.0000 0.6855 90.46
Table 7: Above is the result of estimating peh,t+1 = pt−1 + γ(pt−1 − pt−2) (trend rule)
for the treatment L. The second and third column shows the estimated coefficients
and associated p−value. The fourth and fifth columns show the R2 and MSE of the
regressions.
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sub no. coefficient p-value R-squared MSE
h11 1.6800 0.0000 0.8999 5.93
h12 1.2638 0.0000 0.6702 16.08
h13 1.3632 0.0000 0.8633 6.87
h14 0.8668 0.0000 0.7905 10.89
h15 0.7801 0.0000 0.6656 10.50
h16 0.9782 0.0000 0.9083 3.72
h17 0.8128 0.0000 0.9084 3.28
h18 1.0079 0.0000 0.7970 6.01
h19 0.8899 0.0000 0.8507 6.53
h110 1.0551 0.0000 0.8942 4.05
h21 0.8434 0.0000 0.8304 5.69
h22 0.3924 0.0094 0.6342 7.98
h23 1.3063 0.0000 0.8170 7.20
h24 1.1792 0.0000 0.7111 11.02
h25 1.0043 0.0000 0.5941 9.86
h26 1.4359 0.0000 0.8201 8.90
h27 1.3309 0.0000 0.8471 6.86
h28 1.0385 0.0000 0.8722 4.69
h29 0.8299 0.0000 0.7157 7.58
h210 1.3020 0.0000 0.7530 7.63
h31 0.9991 0.0000 0.8340 14.47
h32 0.8308 0.0000 0.7137 22.66
h33 1.0217 0.0000 0.7923 16.51
h34 1.5963 0.0000 0.8581 16.51
h35 1.0453 0.0000 0.7876 22.65
h36 0.8595 0.0000 0.7749 15.90
h37 1.2799 0.0000 0.6984 24.20
h38 1.0833 0.0000 0.8684 11.72
h39 1.0178 0.0000 0.9056 12.00
h310 0.9741 0.0000 0.7210 28.72
h41 1.2125 0.0000 0.8900 2.18
h42 0.6838 0.0000 0.6961 5.48
h43 0.5317 0.0000 0.8832 1.82
h44 0.4743 0.0000 0.8977 1.38
h45 0.9873 0.0000 0.7496 6.30
h46 1.5941 0.0000 0.8939 2.19
h47 1.0111 0.0000 0.7412 6.18
h48 0.8454 0.0000 0.9236 1.31
h49 0.9166 0.0000 0.8122 2.89
h410 0.7724 0.0000 0.7266 4.15
h51 0.2647 0.0103 0.8732 2.35
h52 0.4867 0.0002 0.8361 3.74
h53 0.7634 0.0004 0.5233 10.24
h54 0.5793 0.0001 0.7596 4.81
h55 0.8311 0.0000 0.6578 5.71
h56 0.4544 0.0002 0.8191 3.17
h59 -1.6471 0.0001 0.5233 37.46
h510 0.3162 0.0035 0.8614 2.59
h61 0.9492 0.0000 0.6132 0.64
h62 0.8532 0.0000 0.7835 0.56
h63 0.6564 0.0000 0.7945 0.33
h64 0.7508 0.0002 0.2124 0.88
h65 0.6911 0.0000 0.8702 0.20
h66 0.5181 0.0020 0.7437 0.59
h67 0.4139 0.0005 0.8560 0.30
h68 1.1561 0.0000 -0.0035 1.04
h69 -0.5571 0.0000 0.9427 0.17
h610 0.8633 0.0000 0.6939 0.62
Table 8: Above is the result of estimating peh,t+1 = pt−1 + γ(pt−1 − pt−2) (trend rule)
for the treatment H. The second and third column shows the estimated coefficients




sub no. coefficient p-value R-squared MSE
n12 1.1441 0.0001 0.5632 14784.77
n14 2.3901 0.0001 0.7382 7373.22
n15 0.8991 0.0000 0.2681 33594.84
n16 -1.9474 0.0002 0.7294 9864.02
n23 1.6129 0.0014 -0.4811 1139.47
n24 0.7178 0.0111 -0.3866 1602.55
n25 2.3567 0.0000 -0.2735 1073.32
n26 1.6181 0.0010 -0.4054 1226.46
n31 1.8283 0.0000 0.9700 58.58
n32 0.9630 0.0000 0.8961 123.36
n33 2.1549 0.0000 0.8971 215.87
n34 1.9045 0.0000 0.9778 37.61
n35 1.8097 0.0000 0.9355 117.92
n36 1.9969 0.0000 0.9308 147.49
n41 1.4924 0.0000 0.6379 94.74
n42 1.0620 0.0000 0.1855 205.61
n43 1.4220 0.0000 0.7582 76.81
n44 1.4690 0.0000 0.5397 127.19
n45 0.8764 0.0006 -0.7967 356.84
n46 1.1083 0.0000 0.4056 104.89
Table 9: Above is the result of estimating peh,t+1 = p
e
t−1+w(pt−1−pet−1) (adaptive rule)
for the treatment N. The second and third column shows the estimated coefficients
and associated p−value. The fourth and fifth columns show the R2 and MSE of the
regressions.
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sub no. coefficient p-value R-squared MSE
l11 0.4619 0.0000 0.0479 150.67
l12 0.4849 0.0000 0.2471 125.01
l13 0.4840 0.0000 0.2772 128.48
l14 0.4430 0.0000 0.2834 127.34
l15 0.3891 0.0000 0.2928 106.76
l16 0.4757 0.0000 0.2459 153.92
l17 0.3937 0.0000 0.2302 91.35
l18 0.4738 0.0000 0.1891 135.73
l19 0.4068 0.0000 0.2375 124.50
l110 0.4179 0.0000 0.2669 132.49
l21 0.5967 0.0000 0.0164 430.89
l22 0.5143 0.0000 -0.0013 344.09
l23 0.6303 0.0000 0.0812 469.06
l24 0.5391 0.0000 0.0232 395.85
l25 0.6113 0.0000 0.0811 462.14
l26 0.7099 0.0000 0.0019 458.48
l27 0.3914 0.0001 0.1809 310.61
l28 0.5274 0.0000 0.0155 442.46
l29 0.5268 0.0000 0.0635 405.38
l210 0.2982 0.0024 0.0430 278.46
l31 0.7413 0.0000 0.1891 475.53
l32 0.8465 0.0000 -0.0452 681.46
l33 0.6175 0.0001 0.0431 488.52
l34 0.5717 0.0005 0.1015 469.95
l35 0.7429 0.0000 -0.0078 572.82
l36 0.7956 0.0000 -0.0180 488.15
l37 0.5062 0.0019 0.1377 482.55
l38 0.7632 0.0000 -0.0195 602.55
l39 0.7369 0.0000 -0.0381 632.69
l310 0.8273 0.0000 -0.0406 684.74
l41 0.2791 0.0333 -0.3353 414.09
l43 0.3348 0.0199 -0.4383 578.56
l44 0.4633 0.0043 -0.5846 731.95
l45 0.3193 0.0264 -0.3835 555.97
l46 0.4213 0.0068 -0.5106 584.35
l47 0.3222 0.0341 -0.5338 600.14
l48 0.4053 0.0083 -0.5638 566.77
l49 0.4615 0.0029 -0.4541 707.45
l410 0.3051 0.0397 -0.4595 575.91
l51 1.5134 0.0000 0.8063 64.57
l52 1.4454 0.0000 0.4944 132.11
l53 0.9800 0.0000 0.4041 121.80
l54 1.2981 0.0000 0.7551 72.13
l55 1.9847 0.0000 0.7761 62.61
l56 1.8417 0.0000 0.5675 128.81
l57 1.6607 0.0000 0.7158 77.25
l58 0.8958 0.0000 0.5452 201.31
l59 1.5538 0.0000 0.7871 47.59
l510 1.7686 0.0000 0.7318 78.20
Table 10: Above is the result of estimating peh,t+1 = p
e
t−1+w(pt−1−pet−1) (adaptive rule)
for the treatment L. The second and third column shows the estimated coefficients
and associated p−value. The fourth and fifth columns show the R2 and MSE of the
regressions.
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sub no. coefficient p-value R-squared MSE
h11 1.3640 0.0000 0.6136 23.42
h12 1.5519 0.0000 0.5616 22.18
h13 1.8027 0.0000 0.8224 9.32
h14 1.1696 0.0000 0.7082 15.49
h15 1.0576 0.0000 0.5227 15.68
h16 1.2825 0.0000 0.8100 7.93
h17 1.4679 0.0000 0.8787 4.56
h18 1.3931 0.0000 0.6565 10.20
h19 1.4350 0.0000 0.7977 9.16
h110 1.2810 0.0000 0.7603 9.75
h21 1.4494 0.0000 0.8305 6.31
h22 1.1443 0.0000 0.6566 8.69
h23 1.6587 0.0000 0.6545 13.85
h24 1.3726 0.0000 0.5843 16.60
h25 1.9535 0.0000 0.6139 10.61
h26 1.2840 0.0000 0.6315 19.41
h27 1.2394 0.0000 0.6708 16.06
h28 1.5541 0.0000 0.8500 6.02
h29 1.3863 0.0000 0.6722 9.31
h210 1.6976 0.0000 0.4589 17.04
h31 1.6872 0.0000 0.8385 15.96
h32 1.4222 0.0000 0.7084 26.56
h33 1.5704 0.0000 0.7472 23.38
h34 1.7744 0.0000 0.6864 40.15
h35 1.6109 0.0000 0.8098 23.34
h36 1.3935 0.0000 0.7081 23.71
h37 2.0169 0.0000 0.6464 30.03
h38 1.3292 0.0000 0.7347 26.67
h39 1.3551 0.0000 0.8454 22.35
h310 1.4018 0.0000 0.6712 36.45
h41 1.5589 0.0000 0.8385 3.80
h42 1.3693 0.0000 0.7231 6.16
h43 1.2472 0.0000 0.7903 3.38
h44 1.3350 0.0000 0.9345 1.18
h45 1.4940 0.0000 0.7541 7.25
h46 1.8161 0.0000 0.4540 11.56
h47 1.5178 0.0000 0.7255 7.75
h48 1.2274 0.0000 0.8661 2.91
h49 1.3224 0.0000 0.7609 4.37
h410 1.1065 0.0000 0.6785 6.47
h51 1.0471 0.0000 0.8885 2.60
h52 1.3454 0.0000 0.8200 4.50
h53 1.3053 0.0000 0.5441 12.09
h54 1.0929 0.0000 0.7168 6.55
h55 0.9028 0.0000 0.4788 9.78
h56 1.1615 0.0000 0.8630 3.19
h57 1.0298 0.0000 0.7382 7.03
h58 0.8944 0.0000 0.8636 4.22
h59 0.6798 0.0000 0.4475 43.58
h510 1.0864 0.0000 0.8865 2.72
h61 1.0969 0.0000 0.6187 2.33
h62 1.2260 0.0000 0.7980 0.71
h63 1.0794 0.0000 0.7986 0.47
h64 0.9364 0.0000 -1.6900 4.00
h65 1.2449 0.0000 0.7339 0.49
h66 1.0313 0.0000 0.7531 0.71
h67 1.0760 0.0000 0.8758 0.37
h68 1.2682 0.0000 0.4142 1.63
h69 0.7364 0.0000 0.9612 0.18
h610 0.9935 0.0000 0.7012 0.98
Table 11: Above is the result of estimating peh,t+1 = p
e
t−1+w(pt−1−pet−1) (adaptive rule)
for the treatment H. The second and third column shows the estimated coefficients
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